- Monitor regional partners' aging systems and actively identify needed replacement equipment and concomitant training. Address the continued need to modernize and expand regional capabilities in communications, command and control, theater missile defense, and littoral undersea warfare.

- Capitalize on E-IMET and IMET programs as venues for developing further security assistance relationships. Institute ongoing review to ensure such efforts balance the security needs of all political entities, contribute to sustaining the peace process and support democratic institutions.

- Identify specialized training to cope with terrorist or other transnational threats.

- Identify specialized training to address Humanitarian Assistance, including demining or other crisis response requirements.

United States European Command (USEUCOM)

Strategic Environment

Each of the theater CINCs has described the challenges, environment, and goals of his respective theater, albeit in different ways. Some are more specific in these descriptions than others. In reviewing the strategic environment of his theater, CINCEUR has defined the challenges that all USEUCOM will face:

- maintain and demonstrate U.S. long-term commitment and engagement
- highly unpredictable impact of technology on the conduct of all operations
- emergence of adversaries seeking to exploit asymmetrical advantages over U.S. forces
- requirement for joint and multinational operations
- transnational character of ethnic conflict, organized crime, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- environmental cooperation

USEUCOM's strategy perceives the AOR as consisting of five regions: Western Europe and NATO; Central Europe; the New Independent States; the Middle East and North Africa; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Within these five regions, the challenges vary and therefore EUCOM's strategy must vary accordingly.

The first of these regions, **Western Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),** is critical to American interests. After almost 50 years as a mutual self defense organization, NATO is transforming itself into a collective security organization, extending membership to three former adversaries in July 1997: Poland; Hungary; and the Czech Republic.

Because of America's membership in NATO as well as common historical and cultural foundations, U.S. International Programs have supported NATO and other Western European countries more comprehensively than any other region in the world. Nonetheless, there has been a "...profound change in the security environment. The discipline imposed by global confrontation is gone. . ..continued U.S. engagement is necessary to ensure the vital trans-Atlantic link continues to serve our mutual interests.""

Central Europe is making a complex economic and political transition toward establishing the rule of law, democracy, stability, and market-based economies. USEUCOM foresees a range of activities with these countries from intensive engagement to an occasional low involvement Partnership for Peace (PfP) event. USEUCOM's participation in this process enhanced by arms control and treaty agreements and member states' access to the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is essential for continued enhanced security in the region.

The six **New Independent States** (NIS) within the USEUCOM AOR, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, present both great challenge and opportunity. Collectively developing within a wide range of government, economic, and socio-political structures from democracy to defacto dictatorships, command or single resource economies to free-wheeling capitalism, they remain united by their common junior partnership with Russia. Their individual

[11] *US EUCOM Strategy of Readiness and Engagement,* April 1998, p. 12.

relationship with Russia will remain their common concern for the near future. For this reason, the NIS will present opportunities for constructive involvement and significant potential obstacles as EUCOM's relationship with them matures.

The fourth region of the USEUCOM AOR is the **Middle East and North Africa.** An area of enduring tensions, it is strategically, politically and commercially important to the United States and its allies. Regional actors, both friendly and hostile, possess large amounts of conventional weaponry, some which is technologically advanced. The threats to U.S. interests include states capable of military challenges through technological surprise, use of, or the asserted use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime. USEUCOM's focus in this region is on maintaining commercial and military lines of communication and ensuring US. engagement, signaling our commitments to the region.

The United States has no permanent military presence in, but does have significant ties to, the fifth region, **Sub-Saharan Africa.** Ongoing problems of African government instability and dysfunction, historic cultural enmities, environmental disaster, disease, refugee flows, organized crime, and economic difficulties have required repeated humanitarian assistance efforts and non-combatant evacuations. USEUCOM's past engagements in the region have included the interaction of American forces with other militaries in the region, providing an example of the proper role for the military in a societal context.

Strategic Elements

To respond to the challenges in its AOR, USEUCOM has defined a strategy of engagement and preparedness, based on fundamental goals enunciated in the President's National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy; promote peace and stability; and defeat adversaries. To accomplish these goals, USEUCOM identifies three strategic elements: **Shape, Respond** and **Prepare.**

Implementation of the first of these elements differs in the five regions of the EUCOM AOR. The second two elements are implemented throughout the AOR in similar fashion. Navy International Programs can best support the first and third of these. USEUCOM describes its effort to "shape" the international environment as ". ..fostering the development of individuals, institutions, nations, and international relationships to reduce the likelihood of conflict, and to deter aggression and coercion"'* This effort includes the forma1 diplomatic arrangements defined by international agreements such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Vienna Document of 1994, and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but also, less formal interaction with the region's nations. Such a program builds a solid base of cooperation that serves the interests of both the United States and other nations.

USEUCOM has described its main principles for "shaping the environment" in Western Europe and NATO as:

- Strengthen NATO
- Maintain bilateral interaction with friendly democratic neutrals in the region
- Maintain a network of bases that can support force projection to and beyond the region

[12] USEUCOM, *Strategy of Readines and Engagement,* p. *23*

- Cooperate on materiel development, acquisition, and maintenance

Within Central Europe:

- Conduct activities with accession nations that help prepare them for full NATO membership
- Support NATO operations
- Strengthen Partnership for Peace (PfP)
- Pursue opportunities for bilateral military contact events
- Continue arms control (negotiations and adherence to treaties and agreements)

The New Independent States:

- Strengthen Partnership for Peace (PfP)
- Pursue opportunities for bilateral military contact events
- Continue arms control (negotiations and adherence to treaties and agreements)
- Support the improvement of environmental security

In the Middle East and North Africa region:

- Maintain American presence through periodic force deployments and Pre-positioned Materiel
- Conduct defense cooperation in armaments
- Encourage military transparency

In Sub-Saharan Africa:

- Allocate resources to foster the development of regional institutions with long-term impact
- Sustain forward presence

USEUCOM Theater Objectives and Navy International Programs

USEUCOM has identified eleven theater objectives. Navy International Programs can actively support USEUCOM in achieving most of these. The eleven are shown below:

Table 2. USEUCOM Theater Objectives and Navy International Programs

	SUPPORT TO CINC FROM IPO PRIMARY MISSIONS			
USEUCOM OBJECTIVES	Cooperative Programs	Technology Transfer	Security Assistance	Comments
1. Protect and take care of the force	X		X	Security assistance resources Cooperative R&D
2. Maintain. support, and contribute to the-integrity and adaptation of NATO	X	X	X	International programs support all aspects of NATO involvement, as well as those of neutral European states
3. Help prepare the militaries of invited nations to integrate into NATO	X		X	E-IMET, Security Assistance R&D information exchange, ESEP
4. Promote stability, democratization, military professionalism, and closer relationships with NATO in the nations of Central Europe and the New Independent States	X	X	X	E-IMET, Security Assistance R&D information exchange, ESEP

USEUCOM OBJECTIVES ⇓⇓	SUPPORT TO CINC FROM IPO PRIMARY MISSIONS: Cooperative Programs	Technology Transfer	Security Assistance	Comments
5. Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress from the Dayton process; develop military institutions in former Yugoslavia adapted to democratic civilian control			X	E-IMET
6. Support peace initiatives in the Middle East and maintain the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship		X	X	Security Assistance, IMET
7. Ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic lines of communication in the Mediterranean	X	X	X	Security assistance resources Cooperative R&D
8. Promote stability, democratization, and military professionalism in Africa		X	X	IMET, Security Assistance resources
9. Provide prompt response to humanitarian crisis			X	Excess Defense Articles
10. Maintain a high state of readiness in USEUCOM forces	X	X	X	All international programs contribute to this goal
11. Implement *JOINT VISION 2010*	X	X		Future systems Cooperative R&D

USEUCOM objectives offer myriad opportunities for Navy International Programs' contribution. In the changed environment of the post-Cold War era, American linkages to NATO remain critical to our national interests. USEUCOM's Theater Strategy notes, "Because technological and industrial capabilities are similar, Western Europe and the U.S. cooperate on the development, acquisition, and maintenance of military materiel through defense cooperation agreements and security assistance programs. These programs offer economies of scale, enhance interoperability, and bring all parties closer to one another. Because they promote security through enhanced cooperation, USEUCOM executes many of these programs for the Department of State and for the Department of Defense."[13]

The Role of Cooperative Programs

As "first world", highly industrialized nations, our NATO allies are prime candidates for participation in Cooperative Programs. The challenge in Europe is the means by which domestic industrial interests and international security interests are balanced. Europe's defense industries are entering post-Cold War consolidation, just as the U.S. has experienced in the mid-90's. We must persuade our allies to resist the temptation of "fortress Europe", as an adversarial defense trade block in opposition to industrial collaboration with the U.S., and to embrace market economics as an indispensable tool for rationalizing its defense industrial infrastructure. As European industry restructures, maintaining open markets will be important to both Europe and the U.S. in order to promote efficient markets and transatlantic cooperation. As national resources devoted to defense

[13] USEUCOM, *Strategy of Readines and Engagement*, p. 26.

continue to decline, international armaments cooperation represents a logical path to meet the needs of our coalition forces in the future and to promote the economic and technical growth of the alliance.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen encouraged expanded support for international Cooperative Programs in a March 1997 Memorandum stating that: "In support of designated international Cooperative Programs, DoD will give favorable consideration to transfers of defense articles, services and technology consistent with national security interests and relevant laws, regulations, policies and international agreements."[14]

The Role of Technology Transfer

Technology transfer requires a delicate balance between several important issues: ensuring interoperability with allies and friends; preventing advanced technology from becoming available to potential or current adversaries; and supporting the industrial base. It has become increasingly more difficult to maintain this balance.

The United States has found itself in increasing competition with its long-time NATO allies for global defense markets to sustain domestic industrial bases. At times, U.S. export restrictions have prevented American industry from exporting technology, thus allowing our NATO allies to benefit from their own less restrictive regulations. Secretary of Defense Cohen's March 1997 memorandum emphasized the need for more future willingness to transfer technology, indicating that while technology transfers would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis through existing channels, "any recommendation by a DoD reviewing organization to deny or require conditions for proposed transfers will be accompanied by specific national security rationale."[15]

The Role of Security Assistance

The United States has had an active security assistance relationship with NATO nations, one that has contributed strongly to the abilities of our military establishments to mesh in coalitions that supported common causes. Common equipment, training, and communications enhance interoperability. For example, FY 97 foreign military sales activity in NATO included the sale of AIM-7P Sparrow air-to-air missiles and the F-l 00 frigate Aegis Combat System to Spain, the AN/AAR-47 missile warning system to Italy, MK 612 Test Set to the Netherlands, and MK 41 Vertical Launch System, AN/S WG- 1 A Harpoon Shipboard Launcher, Mini-DAMA (demand-assigned multiple-access) terminals and data link systems in support of the German and Dutch F-l 24 shipbuilding program. Potential Security Assistance programs to NATO or other nations in the AOR include Foreign Military Sales of new equipment and transfers of Excess Defense Articles to Greece, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Turkey, and ship transfers to Albania, Greece, Spain, Turkey, and Tunisia.

United States Security Assistance programs have been playing a significant role in the stability, democratization, military professionalism, and the development of closer relationships with central European nations, the New Independent States, and other nations of the region. As Central European countries integrate into NATO, they will be interested in acquiring compatible equipment. However, advanced weapon systems are expensive, and acquiring them could unduly stress the finances of these nations. In these instances, EDA with FMS Reserve Program support, is a primary vehicle to meet USEUCOM's security assistance goals.

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[14] Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 23 Mar 1997, Subj: "DoD International Armaments Cooperation Policy," Washington, DC.
[15] Ibid.

Training offered by security assistance programs has been, and will continue to be, particularly important. Mobile Education Teams have provided training to 1,675 military and civilian personnel in 18 former Soviet countries since 1993. Fourteen countries have received, or are scheduled to receive, additional training. A "Democratization" course addressing the role of the military in democracy, legislative liaison, military press relations, balance of power, government ethics, and freedom of expression has been developed and widely presented. An Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) course in Peacekeeping Operations, designed for senior civilian government officials and military officers involved in the planning development, and monitoring of their country's involvement in peace and coalition operations has been developed. IMET programs to promote interoperability among our Navy and our allies, and to support the systems and ships transferred will be particularly emphasized. IMET for Greece and Turkey may be useful in attempting to ameliorate long-standing differences between these two nations — a source of tension for the region and for EUCOM.

Many African nations can benefit from Security Assistance for use in the building of required infrastructure. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are of particular importance to countries that lack the financial resources to purchase them outright and represent an opportunity for Navy International Programs. Training in use of the EDA is critical where some skills may be lacking. Mobile Training Teams can offer on-site training to indigenous personnel and access for Navy representatives to a developing customer base. Further, IMET offers courses that emphasize military professionalism and civil rule. Tailored to Africa's needs, E-IMET could help mitigate the burden of international response to humanitarian emergencies by developing local capabilities.

Planning for International Programs

The objectives that follow for Navy International Programs with NATO and Western European nations are for a **one-to-five year time frame:**

Cooperative Programs

- Proceed with, and follow up on, those programs already in process; identifying follow-on or expanded programs. As programs mature, adapt them to future needs, and ultimately replace or redesign programs with follow-on projects for the skills and capabilities developed through the cooperative effort.

- Use the International Cooperative Opportunities Group (ICOG) and other DOD and DON international programs fora -- NATO, The Technical Cooperation Program, Senior National Representative meetings, Navy-to-Navy staff talks, etc. -- to identify and promote high payoff international cooperative research, development and acquisition efforts in all phases of the acquisition process.

- Support Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Office efforts to develop and implement an international business strategy for the program's Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase that ensures effective continuation of ongoing Concept Demonstration Phase efforts with the U.K., Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy.

- Establish the. Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) as the Link 16 standard solution to improve interoperability in **NATO.**

- Build on the success of the 13 nation NATO Seasparrow consortium to develop new cooperative initiatives in surface ship self defense systems.

Technology Transfer

- Identify possible emerging limitations or constraints on export and competition, and the likelihood of success of an export effort.

- Monitor ongoing efforts and the progress of relaxing export restrictions.

Security Assistance Programs

- Continuation and expansion of ongoing programs for which an evolving NATO is an appropriate market.

- Identify the requirements of the newest NATO members particularly for maritime radars, missiles, and aircraft and invest in aggressive EDA buy or lease programs and collective support agreements between the new members to make U.S./NATO equipment and programs affordable.

- Identify other potential EDA and ship transfer customers with an emphasis on non-traditional military or infrastructure challenges where appropriate.

- Provide life-of-program support for EDA through the FMS Reserve Program.

- Capitalize on E-IMET and IMET programs in the New Independent States (NIS), the former Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and other in-theater states as venues for developing further security assistance relationships. Institute ongoing review to ensure such efforts balance the security needs of all political entities, contribute to sustaining the peace process and support democratic institutions.

- Develop and continue ship transfer programs to Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, and African nations with emphasis on technology and capability upgrades while maintaining a balanced approach such that this effort supports the peace process and theater political stability.

- Review and assess Middle Eastern nation's interoperability with NATO with priorities in compatible communications and training as well as systems. Continued advances in defense capabilities, including theater missile defense and capabilities to defend national oil resources and other assets will be important elements of this plan.

- Institute a program that identifies potential Direct Commercial Sales, or combination FMS/DCS opportunities and targets those opportunities for the Enhanced FMS program.

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)

Strategic Environment

The Pacific Rim's political and military balance is in an accelerated state of change. Six of the largest armed forces in the world operate in the region, which include nuclear weapon states. Mercurial Asian economies, with which much of the rest of the world is increasingly intertwined, depend on the shipping lanes of the South China Sea and archipelagic shipping routes of Southeast Asia. This region contains potential flash points including the inter-Korean border, the relationship between Taiwan and China, ongoing Indian and Pakistani confrontations, and the South China Sea territorial disputes.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery continues in India, Pakistan, and China. Drug trafficking and factionalism in Burma, the continuing Khmer Rouge activity in Cambodia, and the Indonesian situation further contribute to regional security concerns. According to ADM Joseph Prueher, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, in his February 1997 testimony to the Senate: "The key to shaping the regional environment toward a favorable future is stabilizing and maintaining a regional order of comprehensive security that facilitates cooperation across all dimensions of economic, political, and military relations."

Many. nations in the PACOM AOR strenuously resisted multinational security cooperation for years, but the region has made many strides forward. ASEAN and its offshoot, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have become vital to the resolution of multilateral regional security issues. The admission of Vietnam to ASEAN in 1995, and of Burma/Myanmar and Laos in 1997 presents both new challenges and new opportunities. Security challenges faced by ASEAN include occasional aggressive acts by China over disputed territories, piracy, and intrusions into exclusive economic zones. There are several critical choke points, within the ASEAN countries' geography, most notably the Malacca Strait, that are vulnerable to aggression.

China's growing power and its increasing enforcement of its Territorial Waters Law have expanded the threat to its neighbors. As a result, those neighbors have an equally growing need for maritime and aeronautical surveillance capability and for the resources to defend themselves. In 1999, Macau will be returned to China. Given China's actions in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996, as well as, continued threats, the United States must, to the degree allowed by the constraints of the Taiwan Relations Act and the "Shanghai Communique," assist Taiwan in acquiring the necessary defense capabilities to protect its population.

USPACOM Theater Strategy

USPACOM's Theater Strategy is one of preventative defense designed to further the interests of the United States and its Asian-Pacific neighbors by ensuring:

- Credible **U.S.** military, balanced and joint, trained and ready to fight and win

- Forward stationed capabilities which provide a symbol of U.S. commitment

- Positive security relationships with all nations in the region including;
  - Alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines
  - Developing relationship(s) with China
  - Future relationships with such countries as India and Vietnam

- Long-term commitment and long-haul solutions -the U.S. is here to stay

- Teamwork with the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation (Coast Guard), and other U.S. government agencies, ensuring our views are reflected in the interagency process

- Peaceful resolutions to regional events, including preparation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief [16]

With the closure of United States bases in the Philippines, access arrangements between the United States and its regional friends have become increasingly important, both to show continued U.S. commitment to the region and to protect vital U.S. interests. Military engagement is important in maintaining that access, and visibly reaffirming U.S. determination to remain a regional player, partner, and beneficiary.

Navy International Programs, through the complete range of services from Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and FMS Reserve Programs to creative combinations of FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), IMET to complex exercises, offers assurance of that determination at many levels. The following table displays USPACOM's prioritized strategic objectives and the Navy International Program primary missions that are able to support those objectives:[17]

Table 3. Strategic Objectives for Navy International Programs in USPACOM

	SUPPORT TO CINC FROM IPO PRIMARY MISSIONS			
USPACOM STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ⇓⇓	Cooperative Programs	Technology Transfer	Security Assistance	Comments
Maintain Peace and Security	x	X	X	Full range of mission options from IMET to FMS+ + to support coalition building
Prevent and reduce threats posed by NBC weapons	X	X	X	Cooperative Programs and FMS++, particularly IMET

[16] *USCINCPAC Theater Engagement Plan* **(TEP)** *FY99-03: Engagementfor the Pacific Theater,* **(Draft), 29 April 1998, pp. 22-23 ,**
[17] **Ibid,** pp23-24.

Prevent emergence of a regional hegemon	X	X	X	Full range of mission options from IMET to FMS+ + to support coalition building
Maintain U.S. access and influence in the region	X	X	X	FMS, EDA, IMET, Ship Transfers
Prevent a regional arms race	X	X	X	Full range of mission options particularly Cooperative Programs and FMS
Prevent and reduce transnational threats [18]	X	X	X	Cooperative Programs, and FMS, EDA, IMET, Ship Transfers
Achieve fullest possible accounting of U.S. service members missing in action				DON International Programs do not directly contribute to this objective
Enhance interoperability and foster credible defense capabilities of allies and friends	X	X	X	Cooperative Programs and Security Assistance aid interoperability and facilitates multilateral engagement
Maintain, strengthen, and expand security cooperation with regional partners	X	X	X	Full range of mission options from Cooperative Programs to FMS++
Promote democracy and rule of law			X	E-IMET, IMET EDA, and minor FMS, to enhance security capability with accountability

The Role of Cooperative Programs

Cooperative Programs with our allies in the Asian-Pacific region can promote development of common equipment that aids in interoperability among regional forces. Interoperability will support a gradual evolution toward multilateral operations and exercises in a region long known for only bilateral relationships. Multilateral interaction will help diminish long-standing distrust between regional players.

Our relationships with Australia, Japan, and Korea are particularly important. Australia has been a longtime, trusted ally of the United States and continues to be an active partner in further Cooperative Programs. A successful cooperative program, the jointly developed *Nulka* expendable electronic decoy for shipboard anti-missile defense, is a model for future Australia-U.S. Cooperative Programs.

Given the substantial changes occurring in Japan's trade and financial regulations, and its strengthened role in the U.S.-Japan Cooperation Guidelines, increased defense Cooperative Programs

[18] Defined in USPACOM 's engagement plan as Terrorism, illegal drug trade/drug trafficking, uncontrolled migration, and piracy.

may emerge. In its new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), Japan recognized the threats developing within the theater and is accepting a greater role in its own defense. The combination of all these factors makes the prospect of successful Cooperative Programs between the United States and Japan more promising.

Japan has indicated that they would like to move promptly toward participation in a theater ballistic missile program. However, fiscal constraints as a result of a more than six-year recession and the recent turmoil in Asian financial affairs make it difficult for the Government of Japan to embark on a complete theater ballistic missile system in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, cooperative development of parts of the program may be possible, and could benefit both Japan and the United States in assuring regional stability.

South Korea is a technologically advanced ally that has been threatened several times in recent years by North Korea and the People's Republic of China. South Korea is taking on an increasingly larger role in its own defense and needs to build up its military to ensure its capabilities. Cooperative Programs selectively undertaken with South Korea have the potential of highlighting the commitment of the United States to prevent aggression against this nation and the region.

The Role of Technology Transfer

Technology sharing with Asian-Pacific countries supports security cooperation by ensuring the capabilities of our regional allies to act in their own defense and deter potential aggressors. As with Cooperative Programs, Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea are our primary customers and allies in the region and Taiwan is a major customer. Easing the technology transfer restriction has provided Taiwan with the advanced capabilities required to deter hostile acts by China, and augmented development of indigenous systems.

As Japan examines the need for change in its export policies, the possibility of enhanced interaction with Japan increases. The February *1995 United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* indicates that America will place increasing "emphasis on technology-sharing, which we expect to characterize the future of United States-Japan defense procurement cooperation.""[19] Technology sharing with the ASEAN states has potential to continue and expand, so long as the interests of the U.S. are well served. As rapidly developing nations, they increasingly are developing some technology "niches" of their own which will make technology sharing and cooperation more feasible.

The Role of Security Assistance

Security assistance in the form of Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training (IMET) ensures opportunities for joint and combined training with our regional partners, enhanced by the interoperability provided by equipment and services procured through the security assistance mechanism. Security assistance continues to play a key role in the CINC's regional engagement strategy.[20] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its related organizations represent opportunities to support security cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region that had previously been shunned by those regional nations However, ASEAN will be adjusting for several years to its new members and to economic downturns in a region accustomed to booming economies. Increased competition for fewer resources may mean states choose the cheaper, Iess

[19] *United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region,* February 1995, p. 26.
[20] USCINCPAC TEP, P. 35.

capable option to outfit their militaries.[21] EDA represents a particularly important opportunity. With the new Foreign Military Sales Reserve Program in place, EDA provides well supported systems with proven interoperability. Such systems are potential platforms for incremental or targeted upgrades to current technology.

Australia has been one of America's principle allies in the theater since the Second World War, formalized as such by protocol under the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) of 1954. As a result of dynamic events in Asia, the Government of Australia's defense posture has recently undergone a significant review and continues to evolve. Their foreign and trade policy white paper *In the National Interest* and the subsequent Australian Defense Department's *Australia's Strategic Policy* has officially recognized that its security needs are closely tied to the rest of Asia; this includes recognizing that both the threats and alliances of the Asian region have impact on Australia's interests. Australia has also recognized in recent years that they are much better served by full integration with U.S. forces rather than European forces. Protection of sea lines of communication can be expected to be of particular importance to Australia in the future. However, Australia has substantial constraints on its defense budget and much difficulty in convincing its populace of the need for substantial military expenditures.

Despite recent financial challenges, security assistance in the PACOM region has been significant during the last five years. Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand have procured primarily aircraft and missiles. In addition, Japan's purchases of U.S. military equipment have included many gun, missile, torpedo and sensor programs. However, shortfalls exist in Japan's sea-lanes defense capabilities, including airborne early warning and ship-borne missiles.[22]

Japan's *National Defense Program Outline in and after FY* 1996 (NDPO) provides a prescription for the Maritime Self Defense Force's (MSDF) capabilities for the coming twenty years. It also confirms Japan's commitment to regional security and state-of-the-art defense capabilities.[23] The 1996 Defense White Paper "Defense of Japan 1996" described the "New mid-term Defense Program" and addressed the need to replace and modernize equipment to provide:

> "Capabilities to Defend Surrounding Waters and Secure the Safety of Maritime Traffic:
>
> Concerning vessels, build destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers and other ships. Concerning aircraft, continue to acquire patrol helicopters (SH-60J). In addition, with regard to the follow on aircraft to the fixed- wing patrol aircraft (P-3C), take necessary measures after conducting a study."[24]

The White Paper then continues to describe the need for a "Capability to Counter Airborne and Seabome Landing Invasions;" the need for further acquisition of surface-to-ship missiles, transport helicopters, and studies of existing transport aircraft, with subsequent plans to be derived from outcomes of the studies. The mid-term program described in the 1996 White Paper must be reviewed every three years. It seems certain from this that Japan will remain a significant security assistance customer.

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[21] Ibid, p. 36.
[22] *United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region,* p. 26
[23] *National Defense Program Outline in and after FY* 1996, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan Home Page, http://www.mofa.go.jp
[24] "Defense of Japan 1996," Japan Defense Agency Home Page, http://www.jda.go.jp/pab/8aramasi/defcont.htm

America's relationship with the Republic of Korea remains significant. "The transition of the Republic of Korea [ROK] to the leading role in its own defense is a long-standing policy goal of the United States."[25] The ROK Force Improvement Plan continues with efforts to modernize through addition of advanced aircraft, lift helicopters, coastal defense ships and other materiel. The September 1996 grounding of a North Korean submarine on a spying mission on South Korean shores and the June 1998 capture and subsequent scuttling and apparent crew suicide of a North Korean mini-submarine in South Korean waters indicates the need for strengthening capabilities to detect and defend against such intrusions. Continued training and combined exercises are necessary to maintain readiness of both American and ROK forces on the peninsula.

The ROK Policy on national defense cites a determination to pursue, to the extent possible, development of next generation weapon systems using indigenous technology, and to forego purchase of weapon systems from abroad, although "introduction of foreign technologies to promote technology development" is encouraged by the Ministry of National Defense.[26]

Security assistance will remain an important part of America's relationship with ASEAN. The newest member states will be unable to afford substantial cash outlays at the present time, but can benefit from training, grants, EDA, and the FMS Reserve Program for needed equipment. The more mature ASEAN states have been better able to purchase and utilize systems acquired through security assistance programs. However, they are currently experiencing the economic downturns that have had such a great impact on the region's nations, a factor that must be taken into account for current programs and near-term planning. Only Singapore seems relatively free from the impact of the regional economic crisis. Although relatively small, FMF may offer an avenue to keep current and potential procurements on track.[27]

As a result of the March 1996 Chinese missile firings off Taiwan during the island's first democratic presidential election, the United States was forced to send two carrier battle groups to the region at that time. This action underscored Taiwan's need to strengthen its defense against the growing power of China with an emphasis on counter-landing and counter-blockade. Taiwan is replacing its 45-year old force of U.S. destroyers with a mixture of new frigates and guided missile patrol craft escorts. To sustain its force until the new ships are complete, Taiwan requested nine Knox-class frigates from the U.S. The last of these are scheduled for delivery in 1999. Taiwan has also acquired four excess ocean-going minesweepers (MSO) from the U.S. and others are under consideration. ,

Planning for International Programs

The objectives for Navy International Programs with USPACOM AOR nations are for a **one-to-five year time frame** and are keyed to the CINC's strategic objectives:

- Recognizing the effect of the economic downturns experienced by the region's nations, develop a plan that allows such countries to continue planning for systems, programs and training that promote regional interoperability and cooperation, but allow for deferred purchase, deferred actual

[25] *United States Security Strategyfor the Asia-Pacific Region,* February 1995, p. 27.
[26] "ROK Policy on National Defense," Embassy of Korea Home Page, http://korea.emb.washington.dc.US/kogeninfo.milit1.htm
[27] USPACOM TEP, P. 37.

expenditure or "stretchout" of substantial funding obligations. Exercises and bilateral training for these players must also recognize this circumstance.

- Develop a two- to three-year planning goal that anticipates a gradual economic rebound among regional players and their need to make up for constrained expenditures during the current economic downturn. Such a plan recognizes a renewed need for training, joint exercises, and purchases of advanced equipment.

- Develop a long-range plan that anticipates growth in cooperation between the region's nations in the form of joint exercises and operations. Focus on exercises that emphasize protection of Exclusive Economic Zones, strategic regional sea-lanes, and the surrounding air space. Maritime patrol, surveillance equipment, sensors, C4I systems and training will be emphasized, particularly by states adjacent to choke points or with territorial disputes.

- Recognize that Japan is a candidate for acquiring piecemeal component or contributing systems that could eventually form part of a Theater Missile Defense capability. Develop a plan that incorporates Theater Missile Defense as a long-range goal using the FY96 NDPO as a guide.

- Proceed with, and follow-up on, those programs already in process with Japan; identifying follow-on or expanded programs and leverage the upgrade opportunities indicated in the FY96 NDPO. As programs mature, adapt them to future needs, ultimately looking towards replacement, or eventual discontinuation. Develop follow-on projects for the skills and capabilities developed through the cooperative effort.

- Observe any shifts in Japan's Mid-term Defense Program as it is reviewed. New emphasis may be placed on needed systems depending on shifts in the geopolitical environment, such as further anti-Taiwan activities by China, intrusions onto disputed islands, and the status of North Korea.

- Acknowledging the general financial situation, develop a plan that focuses on foreign military sales of ship weapons, surveillance, sensor and C4I systems for the Republic of Korea indigenous* destroyer (KDX series).

- Explore programs that will enhance the Republic of Korea's ability to control its littoral seas and coastal approaches. Particularly focus on maritime patrol and surveillance, mining, shipboard sensors, C4I and coastal defense. EDA including ship transfers, may prove an economical path to these goals.

- Identify potential opportunities with Australia for replacement or upgrade of their aging maritime patrol aviation capability.

- Identify potential prospects for co-development and/or co-production, Foreign Comparative Test (FCT) program, data exchange, or Security Assistance programs to enhance Australia's *ANZAC* class frigate, new Collins-class submarines, and Perry class frigates.